This article studies with a business history framework the history of immigrant entrepreneurship of a North American family in Peru, whose origin goes back to the second half of the nineteenth century and its development takes place in the first forty years of the twentieth century. The origins go back to Ernesto Thorndike, a North American businessman whose business trajectory was situated principally in Peru. At the end of his life, he saw the decline of his fortune despite his social and intellectual capital, of being part of the economic and social elite of Lima at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginnings of the twentieth, and of the diversification of its businesses. The article analyzes this evolution and indicates driving factors of success and decline: intellectual capital un-exploitable because of Peru´s political and economic instability (the construction of railroads was paralyzed at the end of nineteenth century); the lack of speed to produce the necessary tacit technical knowledge to diversify of its businesses; and the lack of bonding social capital, which prevented the constitution of a family business group that capitalized contacts and relationships that extends in time the existence of firms beyond a generation.
Introduction
Business history has flourished in recent decades to study the history of immigrant entrepreneurship in the United States before World War II, focusing in the arrival and varied fortunes of European, Asian, and African immigrants. However, literature for this chronological period very rarely has paid attention to the history of North American emigrants in other regions of the world. Latin America was an important destination of multinationals in the first half of of North American entrepreneurs who made fortune in Latin America. It is well known the case of Steve Aronso Fletcher in Costa Rica, a North American economist, who founded the firms linked to the Britt Group, a coffee producer. He later entered in the chocolate, theater, tourism and gift shop businesses (Leiva and Guillén 2015, 311) . North American entrepreneurs in Lima were very few: in a detailed research of big Peruvian fortunes during 1916 -1960 , Portocarrero (2010 only found seven North Americans who died in Peru and left a testament to his inheritors. However, the details of their businesses and their lives remains unstudied.
The structure of the paper is like this. First, a brief biography of John Larkin and Ernesto
Thorndike. Second, the theoretical approaches used to analyze the case. Finally, an analysis of the decline of Ernesto´s fortune using the theoretical concepts presented before.
In regards to the sources for the reconstruction of the business career of Ernesto Thorndike, we have used the private family archive of "Ricardo Wiesse Thorndike." The mentioned archive is composed of: personal correspondence, balance sheets, testimonies of deeds, leases, property purchase and sale contracts, articles of incorporation from commercial companies, list of inventories and books from the "Buenavista" Fund diary (Chao Valley, Trujillo) , and stocks and bonds from banks and companies. These sources of information will be contrasted and complemented with the "probate records" of Ernesto Thorndike, which contains his will and property inventory list from different years prior to his death. Also, we were able to find information in the Public Notary Archive and the Archive of the Peruvian Foreign Office concerning some of the investments of John and Ernesto Thorndike.
The Thorndike case
Background: the vicissitudes of politics and the economy in mid-19th-century Peru Some eleven million tons of seabird excrement resolved the economic and political crisis that beset Peru a few short decades on from its independence: from 1840 to 1880, the country sold around US$ 700 million of guano, the nitrate-rich fertilizer required for agriculture the world over (Klaren 2012, 203) . However, by the mid-1870s, reserves had run out, guano had started to be replaced by saltpeter, and a vast external debt had been built up entirely due to loans tied to the commodity. Huancayo, as part of the Dreyfuss Contract, the execution of which began on January 1, 1870
with the laying of the first stone at Monserrate Station, Lima (Bartkowiak 1998, 170-172) . In this context, John Larkin was sent by Meiggs to supervise certain sections of the Central Railroad, given his experience with bridges and in mountainous areas (Gallegos 2001, 82) . had financed railroads and other works sought to recover their money; the contract was the means of regulating the reimbursement process. As part of this agreement, the railroads were handed over to the creditors for a 66-year period, during which time they repaired the damage inflicted by the conflict through the company they set up, Peruvian Corporation (Contreras and Cueto 2009, 178-180) . This served to negate the agreements signed by the government prior to the Grace Contract. John Larkin was directly and adversely affected by this situation given his rights and interests in relation to the railroads. Indeed, he was left on the brink of financial ruin, but was spared by his son, Ernesto Thorndike, and his efforts at diversification. However, John
Larkin's investments in railroad construction and administration were not confined to the Peruvian sphere, as he extended his interests to Bolivia in 1890. In that country, John Larkin was granted a 20-year concession to build railroads and tramlines on the banks of the Desaguadero River and Lake Poopó, to the population centers and mining sites. transmitted. We are interested in the first one because it´s distinctive of the business and can be converted in a key factor of competitiveness:
"Tacit knowledge is non-codified and non-patentable knowledge. It is accumulated in an organization through business activities that include the production and marketing of goods or services. Compared with codified or formal knowledge, tacit knowledge is ineffable or inexpressible." (Jaskiewicz et al. 2013 ).
The second type of resource is social capital, which consists of contacts accessible by relationships. Business evolution is dynamic and needs new information that secures businesses or to facilitate loans obtained by those deals. Concerning social capital, there are three dimensions (Nahapiet and Ghosal 1998) (Wong et al. 2018) . First, the structural, which refers to "the overall pattern of connection between actors, who you reach and how you reach them".
This resource comes from two sources: bounding social capital, which "stems from the network closest to the individual"; the second, bridging social capital, "is a product of new bonds formed in society". Different combinations of these sources generate different organizational forms until reaching family business group, which maximizes contacts. For the ends of this paper, we must explain the case of transnational trading networks, a combination of high bridging social capital and low bounding social capital. The advantages of bridging social capital have its origins in the role of the broker, which is the intermediary between seller and buyers of goods and services (Carney, 2007: 295) . The second dimension, the cognitive, refers to "the resources that allow networks of contacts to communicate accordingly through language, vocabulary, and collectively shared narratives". The third and last dimension, the relational, refers to the possibility of qualifying a transaction an arm´s length transaction, where you are sure to receive a product or service according to specified (Hite and Hesterly 2001) . About the theoretical approach of learning curve: a firm grows by harnessing economies of scale. It is supposed that learning leads to reducing the unitary cost of production. This theory say that "increases in cumulative production have been associated with the improvement of work methods, a fine-tuning of the production operation, and detailed learning about how to make the production of products as efficient as possible" (Barney 2001, 240) .
Investment portfolio of Ernesto Thorndike and the reasons for his fortune´s fall
The investment portfolio of Ernesto Thorndike
We show the composition of the investment portfolio of Ernesto. Later, with the information provided by the archive of the Thorndike family and his property distribution inheritance file 9 ,
we analyze the factors that allowed the scope of the portfolio and its subsequent deterioration.
To understand the portfolio, a starting point is the research of Portocarrero (2010) 
✓

Finances and Mining
The Thorndike family sensed that their proximity to certain sectors could render them a strategic resource. Thus, they were minority shareholders in the Banco de Arequipa. Then, in the mining sector, they acquired silver mines in Copiapó (Chile), and purchased 300 shares in the Montebello-Orcco Mining Company in the department of Puno, Peru, in 1908.
✓
Real estate
We deduce that the family sought to reduce the level of risk in their investment portfolio by investing in real estate. As such, they owned a dozen properties distributed across Chorrillos in Lima and Callao, Lima's port region. These properties were valued at 5,786,336 constant soles of 1950, and accounted for 70% of the total inheritance of the second generation of Thorndikes (Portocarrero 2010 ). In addition, Ernesto was a minority shareholder in the Compañía Mercantil de La Oroya and in the Compañía de Obras Publicas de Lima, of which his father had been a director. The Director rejects Ernesto´s proposal to build a railway between Paita (Piura) and the Marañón River, to transport rubber. Reasons: high taxes; the price of rubber will fall by the time the railways would be finished because of rising global production; the certified rubber production is not optimum. They could reconsider their position if the Government undertakes to invest 8,000 pounds per mile.
Ethelburga Syndicate Limited
The firm tells Ernesto why they didn´t fund the Paita-Marañón River project in the past: the Government wasn´t disposed to pay for exploratory and research costs if the project wasn´t approved. In addition, the firm already had a concession (Lima-Huacho) that apparently had problems with the Government, and were not disposed to initiate a new business with them until that one got resolved. They agreed to talk about the matter in a future appointment.
Bolivian Development Syndicate
Letter that confirms the hiring of Ernesto as a lawyer by the firm, to obtain contracts with the Peruvian and Bolivian governments, among other duties of representation for the firm.
Rejection of an Ernesto´s proposal to build a railway (doesn´t say which one), because they weren´t interested at that moment.
R. W. Peirs
Mr. Peirs gives his impressions about a railway project proposed by Ernesto, but can´t assure if their partners would agree.
Mr. Peirs rejects Ernesto´s proposal for lacking a better investment profile.
Director de S. Pearson & Son Limited Contractors
A financial advice to Ernesto: the Peruvian government must ensure certain quantity of money to pay the bonds they´re about to emit for funding a railway. The Peruvian government has been in default for several years and it will not be credible unless it mortgages a great quantity of revenues.
The Council created a firm called Peruvian Corporation, which gained the concession for some railways. In 1907, the Peruvian government couldn´t pay an annual sum accorded in the contract, so they gave the railways for 17 more years, but they still had to pay some money to the Council. In 1924, the railways became property of the Peruvian Corporation because of the government´s inability to pay the annual sums. These three factors: the geographical difficulties to build railways; their probably low profitability; and the Peruvian government´s insolvency, convinced Ernesto that, probably, business opportunities might have ended in this sector.
The letters in Table 3 show that British firms saw several difficulties to fund railway projects to conditions that the government could not accept, thus stopping the loans (Kemp 2002, 71 (Gonzales 1985, 41) . On the other hand, the success of the landowners is also partly due to the technological development they could implement to their production, since it was useless to have large quantities of harvest if they were not able to process and transport it. This progressive mechanization of agricultural work made it necessary to pay attention to other variables, such as the choice of seeds and fertilizers, the use of groundwater currents, simplifying harvesting techniques, hiring teams of agronomists and having laboratories in the same haciendas (Gonzales 1985, 58) .
If the cases of the cotton farms are analyzed, as was in Buenavista & Anexos, it is observed that their production had a constant growth in the first decades of the 20th century. However, prosperity stopped in the mid-1920s due to the recovery of the U.S. cotton market (after the 1921 weevil plague) and the disastrous floods of the El Niño phenomenon of 1925. To these factors, consider that the cotton farmers did not play an important role in the promotion of large projects, unlike those dedicated to sugar production. This is because their profits did not reach the same level as the large sugar estates and because, in contrast to these, they concentrated their investments at a local level instead of operating on the large scale (Thorp and Bertram 2013, 88-9).
Ernesto did not generate the necessary expertise to raise production, improve work methods, neither generate an efficient production. The limits of Ernesto´s wealth were the lack of a familiar organization of support, the ending of opportunities for railway projects, joining shortterm businesses, and lack of agricultural knowledge.
Conclusions
The case of Ernesto Thorndike, an immigrant businessman of American origin, who developed ventures in Peru during the end of nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, This factors relate to the changing and unpredictable environment; the crisis after the Pacific War; the inability of the Peruvian government to generate trust and solvency to comply with commitments; and the inadequacy of Ernesto´s capital accumulation methods, expertise, bonding capital, and tacit knowledge of alternative businesses.
Ernesto´s alternative was venture diversification. But considering that, in order to be successful, resources must be valuable, non-replaceable, and hard to be replicated by competitors; and the entrepreneur must have accumulated expertise and trusting relationships from bonding social capital; one can infer that this was not the case. Even more, the bet on agriculture, in his advanced age, was not supported by his siblings or offspring (lack of a family business group).
Ernesto, a bourgeois businessman, with accumulated intellectual capital, of American origin, well integrated with Lima society, finally got his fortune dissolved in his last years, because of an unstable environment, lack of bonding social capital, lack capabilities or expertise that had to be learned rapidly due to the diversification he was forced to do, and to lack of expertise in his last venture: agricultural exploitation.
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